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Abstract 
This paper discusses the Fedon case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which involved a 
claim for compensation by Fedon (an Italian producer of eye glass cases) from the EU for the 
imposition of WTO-authorized retaliatory trade barriers by the United States following the failure by 
the EU to comply with an adverse ruling by the WTO regarding its import-regime for bananas. As a 
result of the EU non-compliance, European banana distributors and some bananas producers 
benefitted from WTO-illegal protection, at the expense of a set of EU exporters, including Fedon, that 
were hit by US countermeasures. By not complying with its international (WTO) obligations, the EU 
redistributed income across producers in different sectors as well as between suppliers and consumers 
of bananas. Fedon contested the non-compliance by the EU before the ECJ and sought compensation. 
This paper assesses the ECJ ruling against Fedon and argues that the ECJ got it wrong, both in terms 
of legal principle and as a matter of legal technicalities. An alternative approach is proposed that 
would better balance individual rights to property against the ‘general’ EU interest whether or not to 
comply with adverse WTO rulings. 
Keywords 
Trade agreements, retaliation, dispute settlement, compensation, EU law, WTO 
JEL Classification: F13, K41, K42 
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1. Introduction* 
In 1998, as part of a long-running dispute between the US (as well as several banana producers in 
Latin America) and the EU, the Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO found that the EU policy regime for 
imports of bananas was inconsistent with various provisions of the WTO dealing with trade and goods 
and services (EC–Bananas III). After elapse of the reasonable period of time for implementing the AB 
ruling, the US requested authorization to retaliate against products originating in the EU given that the 
EU had failed to comply.
1
 Countermeasures in the WTO to date have taken only one form: suspension 
of concessions in WTO-legalese, whereby the injured state imposes a cost equivalent to that created by 
the WTO-violating measure(s) put in place by the author of the illegal act. Usually this is done by 
increasing tariffs on imports of products originating in the trade partner, although concessions in other 
areas (trade in services, trade in intellectual property rights) as well can conceivably be withdrawn. 
In the absence of agreement between the EU and the US on the appropriate level of 
countermeasures, this matter was submitted to arbitrators.
2
 Based on a decision by the arbitrators, the 
WTO (through the DSB, the Dispute Settlement Body) authorized the US to impose annual retaliation 
in the amount of US$191.4 million against products originating in the EU. The list of products on 
which tariffs were raised by the US included products made by Fedon, an Italian company 
manufacturing articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket or in the handbag, with outer surface of 
sheeting of plastic, of reinforced or laminated plastics (i.e., cases for eyewear). In April 1999 the US 
imposed duties of 100% ad valorem on imports of Fedon products,
3
 leading to an extra duty of 95.4% 
on Fedon products (§34 of the CFI decision). Fedon suffered considerable damage as a result of the US 
measures,
4
 and, through its request to the CFI
5
 (and the European Court of Justice, ECJ, on appeal 
later), sought to be reimbursed for the damage suffered.
6
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present and analyse the judgment, 
and explain why, in our view, the Court got it wrong. In Section 3 we briefly recap the consequences 
of the judgment, and discuss how similar decisions may affect the incentives of EU firms to invest in 
export markets. In Section 4 we explore whether Fedon could have been brought to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and conclude that in light of the strategy followed such recourse was 
probably not in the cards. Finally, in Section 5, we present a proposal to establish a fund that would 
compensate innocent bystanders that are injured as a result of EU decisions not to abide by its 
international trade obligations. Our main conclusions follow in Section 6. 
                                                     
*
 We are indebted to Jean-François Bellis, Jagdish Bhagwati, Chad Bown, Carlo Maria Cantore, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 
Giuseppe Martinico, Andrea Mastromatteo, Luca ‘Rubentus’ Rubini, Kamal Saggi, André Sapir, Vassilis Tzevelekos for 
helpful discussions and useful comments, as well as to participants at conferences and seminars at the European 
University Institute, Maastricht University, Columbia Law School, and SciencesPo where previous drafts of this paper 
were presented. 
1
 See Hoekman and Kostecki (2009) for a summary of the long saga of the bananas dispute in the WTO. The retaliation 
that is the focus of this paper was linked to the third time a formal dispute had been brought to the GATT/WTO. Guth 
(2012) recounts the end of the bananas saga and the eventual resolution of the dispute between the EU and the 
complainants. 
2
 As per Art. 22.6 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
3
 See T-135/01, on Fedon vs. Council and Commission of 14 December 2005.  
4
 §46 of the CFI Fedon decision.  
5
 The CFI was subsequently re-named the General Court. Mavroidis (2007) discusses the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
decision on Fedon 
6
 The damage to Fedon was €2,289,242 including interest (§56, CFI Fedon decision). 
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2. Analysis of the Judgment 
2.1 The Claims 
The plaintiff raised two claims before the CFI:  
(a) even assuming that the EU authorities had not acted illegally, Fedon should still be compensated 
for the damage suffered since, under EU law, the EU organs can be held responsible if damage 
results from their legal actions;  
(b)  that the EU had acted illegally (by practising a WTO-inconsistent bananas import regime) which 
provoked the US countermeasures and, as a result, Fedon suffered trade damage.  
Both the CFI and the ECJ rejected both claims, albeit on different grounds. 
2.2 Responsibility from Legal Actions 
The CFI first noted that, for the EU to be held responsible, the damage must be unusual and special. In 
the case at hand, the CFI held that the damage suffered by Fedon was not unusual; hence its claim 
should be rejected. The CFI first explained (§153) that, as constant case law had made clear, the EU 
could be held responsible for legal actions if three conditions were cumulatively satisfied:
7
  
(a) a damage exists;  
(b) a causal link between the damage and actions by the EC institutions has been demonstrated; and  
(c) the damage is unusual and special.  
The discussion in Fedon hinges on the interpretation of the term ‘unusual’, since the CFI satisfied 
itself that a damage indeed existed (§162), and that there was a causal link between the damage and 
the EU bananas import regime (§183). The CFI found that the damage suffered by Fedon was not 
unusual and for this reason rejected the claim of the plaintiff. Because of this finding, it did not 
proceed to establish whether the damage was special (§200).  
Damage is unusual, in the CFI’s evaluation, if foreseeing it lies beyond the bounds of the economic 
risks that are inherent in the sector concerned (§191). In this case, the damage was deemed not unusual 
because Fedon could have foreseen that it could be exposed to the risk of confronting retaliation if it 
exported its products to the US market (§198). Why is this case? Simply because, so the CFI argued, 
there is an inherent vicissitude in the WTO system, which allows for countries to take counter-
measures when they are facing illegality under the WTO (§§194–197). Since counter-measures could 
hit anyone, they could hit Fedon as well, so the argument of the CFI goes. Consequently, Fedon, in the 
CFI’s view, when deciding to export its product to the US market, should have taken into account that:  
(a) the EU would adopt the bananas regime it ended up putting in place; 
(b) that this would damage US interests; 
(c) that the US would decide to challenge the EU regime before the GATT; 
(d) that the GATT would find against the EU; 
(e) that the EU would not comply but modify its regime instead; 
(f) that the US would challenge the EU regime again, before the WTO this time; 
(g) that the new EU regime would have been found WTO-inconsistent; 
(h) that the EU would once again decide not to comply; 
(i) that the US would take counter-measures pending compliance; 
(j) and that the US counter-measures would hit Fedon products. 
                                                     
7
 Dorsch Consult v. Council and Commission, ECJ, C-237/98, Rec. 2000, I-4549, §19. 
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Fedon should also have factored in that bananas distributors are a more powerful lobby in the EU than 
the industries and producers that would be selected for counter-measures by the US, since, otherwise, 
the EU would have decided to comply. Hence, Fedon should have anticipated not only that it would be 
hit by the US countermeasures; it should have also anticipated the identity of all other EU producers 
that would have been hit. Clearly it is ludicrous to expect any entrepreneur to foresee all the 
contingencies mentioned above. Even assuming that they can and do, what is the remedy? Stop 
exporting? But this would go against the very purpose of the WTO: to liberalize international 
exchange, which presumably is why the EU participates in it.  
Even if one uses a much lower threshold for what can be expected of EU firms when planning 
export investments – such as the incorporation of a probability that the EU might violate its 
commitments and thus that EU exports might be retaliated against and that this might affect the firm in 
the future – it is unreasonable to expect this to be factored into any investment decision. In practice 
retaliation is very rare – in the 1990s (before the Bananas retaliation) less than 0.0002 percent of US 
imports had been subjected to retaliatory counter-measures directed at the EU.
8
 The EU has a strong 
reputation among international business as a law-abiding trading power that consistently has called for 
a stronger rules-based multilateral trade regime and that has a long track record of abiding by its 
international trade commitments. Including a non-zero probability of the EU not abiding by its WTO 
commitments cannot reasonably be expected to have entered into any investment decision-making 
process.  
In the event, this finding by the CFI was overturned. The ECJ, hearing this case on appeal, held that 
EU law, at its current stage of maturity, could not accommodate this type of claim. It did so against the 
elaborate opinion of the Advocate General who had taken position in favour of acknowledging EU 
responsibility stemming from a legal act (§§135, 169-172, and especially §188): 
The Court has held that Community law as it currently stands does not provide for a regime 
enabling the liability of the Community for its legislative conduct to found an action in a situation 
where any failure of such conduct to comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon 
before the Community courts. The claims for compensation by the applicants sought in particular 
to put in issue the liability of the Community for such conduct. Accordingly, the Court of First 
Instance could only dismiss those claims, whatever the arguments put forward by the applicants to 
support them. 
Had the Court stopped here, one might have had little to add to the analysis. The soundness of the 
arguments presented by the Advocate General notwithstanding, it is at the end of the day the privilege 
of the ECJ to decide on the ambit of EU law: it is the final authority on how to interpret the policy 
space that has been ceded to the EU by the Member States. The Court however, attempted to justify its 
position by offering a quasi-moral explanation why it had to be this way. In §183 of the judgment it 
held: 
With regard, more specifically, to the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or 
profession, the Court has long recognised that they are general principles of Community law, 
while pointing out however that they do not constitute absolute prerogatives, but must be viewed 
in relation to their social function. It has thus held that, while the exercise of the right to property 
and to pursue a trade or profession freely may be restricted, particularly in the context of a 
common organisation of the market, that is on condition that those restrictions in fact correspond 
to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and that they do not constitute, with 
regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the 
very substance of the rights guaranteed 
This paragraph is difficult to understand. How can it be that general interest of the EU is to protect 
bananas distributors whose practices are violating the EU’s commitments under the WTO (thus 
                                                     
8
 US retaliation in the Hormones case was some $120 million per year, compared to total US imports that averaged $750 
billion during the 1990s.  
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opening the way for the US to retaliate), while punishing Fedon and other firms that played by the 
rules all along? This raises the question as to what the benchmark is for evaluating the general EU 
interest. Should Fedon understand that the social function of its property rights is to subsidize the 
income of bananas distributors? The Court can of course hide behind the case law that the general EU 
interest is not justiciable. But is this practice consistent with the idea of the rule of law and the 
‘Rechtsstaat’ that the EU supposedly is pursuing, especially since we are not dealing with a legislative 
action proscribing the irrelevance of WTO law, but with judge-made law only? We will revert to this 
matter in what follows. 
2.3 Responsibility for Committing an Illegality 
The CFI had held that the EU institutions did not commit an illegality in violating its WTO 
commitments, and that, consequently, the EU had no obligation to compensate Fedon (§142). Three 
conditions (commission of an illegal act; damage; and a causal link between the two) must be 
cumulatively met for compensation to be due. One of these (commission of the illegal act) was 
missing in this case, as in the CFI’s view WTO law is not a valid benchmark against which the legality 
of EU law will be measured (§103). The CFI argued that it would only be a valid benchmark if:  
(a) the EU intended to execute a particular obligation assumed at the WTO-level, or  
(b) EU legislation explicitly refers to WTO law (§107).  
The CFI observed that neither of these limiting conditions was present in this case, and, therefore, it 
concluded that Fedon could not invoke WTO law to establish the EU’s responsibility (§135). The ECJ 
upheld this finding of the CFI as well as its rationale. The key paragraphs in the ECJ decision are 
reproduced below. 
111 As regards, more specifically, the WTO agreements, it is settled case-law that, given their 
nature and structure, those agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the 
Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions (see, in 
particular, Portugal v Council, paragraph 47; Biret International v Council, paragraph 52; and 
VanParys, paragraph 39). 
112 It is only where the Community has intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in 
the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise 
provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community 
measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (see Biret International v Council, paragraph 53, 
and VanParys, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). 
115 Court also held in that judgment that, by undertaking after the adoption of the DSB’s decision 
of 25 September 1997 to comply with the WTO rules and, in particular, with Articles I(1) and XIII 
of the GATT 1994, the Community did not intend to assume a particular obligation in the context 
of the WTO, capable of justifying an exception to the principle that WTO rules cannot be relied 
upon before the Community courts and enabling the Community courts to review the legality of 
Regulation No 1637/98 and the regulations adopted to implement it in the light of those rules (see, 
to this effect, Van Parys, paragraphs 41 and 52). 
116 It should be remembered that the decisive factor here is that the resolution of disputes 
concerning WTO law is based, in part, on negotiations between the contracting parties. 
Withdrawal of unlawful measures is admittedly the solution recommended by WTO law, but other 
solutions are also authorised (Omega Air and Others, paragraph 89).  
119 The Court also pointed out that to accept that the Community courts have the direct 
responsibility for ensuring that Community law complies with the WTO rules would effectively 
deprive the Community’s legislative or executive organs of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by 
their counterparts in the Community’s trading partners. It is not in dispute that some of the 
contracting parties, including the Community’s most important trading partners, have concluded 
from the subject-matter and purpose of the WTO agreements that they are not among the rules 
applicable by their courts when reviewing the legality of their rules of domestic law. Such lack of 
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reciprocity, if accepted, would risk introducing an imbalance in the application of the WTO rules 
(Van Parys, paragraph 53). 
129 A recommendation or a ruling of the DSB finding that the substantive rules contained in the 
WTO agreements have not been complied with is, whatever the precise legal effect attaching to 
such a recommendation or ruling, no more capable than those rules of conferring upon individuals 
a right to rely thereon before the Community courts for the purpose of having the legality of the 
conduct of the Community institutions reviewed. (italics in the original). 
In what follows we take each of these grounds for rejecting Fedon’s claim in turn and question their 
validity.
9
 We should state at the outset that the Court did not have to go into such great pains to reach 
its conclusion: it could for example have mentioned only the first of the grounds for rejecting Fedon’s 
request, i.e., that the WTO law is not a benchmark on which to evaluate the legality of EU actions in 
the field of international trade policy except for the two instances mentioned above, neither of which 
was present in the instant dispute. Why spend time and effort mentioning the other grounds as well?  
2.3.1 WTO Law is Benchmark in only Two Cases  
No express reference to WTO law. The ECJ found nowhere in the relevant EU documents an explicit 
reference to WTO law, so the conclusion in the eyes of the judges was inescapable. But is not this 
construction tantamount to stating that the performance of international obligations will be decided on 
the basis of domestic law? Such an attitude is clearly in contradiction with customary international law 
rule enshrined in Art. 27 VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties):  
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty.  
The EU did not intend to abide by the DSB decision. The DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) decision 
reflects the adoption of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) report condemning the EU practices (the EC–
Bananas III report). In the ECJ’s view there is an inherent vicissitude in WTO law which distinguishes 
it from other legal systems: once inconsistency has been established, the author of the illegal act does 
not have to implement its obligations; it can negotiate some form of compensation. The EU did not 
intend to assume a particular obligation when the DSB decision fell; were the ECJ to grant Fedon 
compensation, it would have had ipso facto, so the argument goes, deprived the EU executive from 
negotiating a deal with its trading partners.  
From a practical perspective, an ECJ decision in favour of the plaintiff does not have any effect on 
the EU’s discretion to negotiate a deal with its trading partners: Fedon requests compensation for costs 
it has already incurred (the extra tariffs it has been forced to pay, and the lost sales that result from a 
100% tariff). The EU could have compensated Fedon while looking for a negotiated settlement with 
the US. Because of the de facto absence of retroactivity of WTO remedies, there is no risk of paying 
twice. Actually, the EU is paying the US less, substantially less in this case, than the damage it has 
caused: the damage starts from the date the illegality occurred; the obligation to compensate kicks in, 
by WTO case law-construction, at the end of the reasonable period of time within which the EU 
should have complied with the adverse ruling.
10
  
More importantly, it is very disturbing to hear from the ECJ that an international treaty will be the 
benchmark if, and only if, the EU intended this to be the case. The message to the EU’s trading 
partners is that when the EU signs international treaties, sometimes it might, and sometimes it might 
not intend to abide by it. Our judges should think about the incentives they create for our (trading) 
partners through similar case law.  
                                                     
9
 Alemanno (2008), Arcuri and Poli (2010), and Dani (2010) have all offered critical comment on the Fedon judgment.  
10
 Mavroidis (2000) discusses the de facto absence of retroactivity of WTO remedies. 
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2.3.2 Flexibility of the WTO Contract 
The ECJ, when arguing that the EU’s options will be constrained if compensation were paid to Fedon, 
mischaracterizes the WTO by describing it as a totally flexible instrument when it comes to 
compliance. As a matter of principle, Art. 22 DSU
11
 reveals a clear preference in favour of ‘property 
rules’ (specific performance of the contract); ‘liability rules’ (suspension of concessions) in the WTO 
is an interim solution that is only available until compliance has been achieved, and is aimed at 
inducing compliance. The obligation imposed on the EU by virtue of the DSB decision is to remove 
the illegal practice; in the meantime, until the moment when compliance has occurred, the EU could 
be paying compensation. In this respect, there is no difference between WTO and EU law: indeed the 
latter also, on occasion, provides for a payment of fines until compliance has been achieved. Neither 
legal order can prejudge when compliance will occur, and many factors (which we could encompass in 
the term ‘opportunity cost of non-compliance’) can affect whether and when compliance will occur. It 
follows that from a compliance perspective, being subjected to countermeasures is not a solution 
equivalent to specific performance of the obligations assumed. If the ECJ aims to suggest that all 
systems with interim liability rules are, because of this idiosyncratic element, systems which do not 
require specific performance, it will have to consider the implications of this statement for the EU 
legal order as well.  
What about the payment of compensation which is also envisaged in Art. 22 DSU? Payment of 
compensation is also an interim solution until compliance has been achieved. Hence, being subjected 
to compensation does not amount to compliance. The function of compensation is thus identical to that 
of suspension of concessions, and the differences between the two instruments are that the former is a 
negotiated settlement between author of the illegal act and injured party, whereas retaliation could
12
 be 
the outcome of arbitration; retaliation always takes the form of suspension of concessions or other 
obligations, while the form compensation can take is not statutorily prescribed. In practice, 
compensation has been paid only twice since the establishment of the WTO in 1995.
13
  
2.3.3 Reciprocity Considerations 
The ECJ pays attention to the fact that other WTO Members do not allow private parties to claim 
compensation before domestic courts for violations of the WTO contract. The Court however, fails to 
explain why this is a legally-relevant consideration. It could be a policy-relevant consideration, but 
making policy is not the mandate of the ECJ. The conditions under which private parties can invoke 
any law before the ECJ should be defined using as benchmark one body of law only: EU law. 
Standing should be conferred using domestic, not foreign, law as benchmark.  
2.3.4 Absence of Direct Effect of WTO Law 
The Fedon case is not about direct effect. Fedon did not argue that by virtue of a WTO provision it 
was entitled to a sum of money; Fedon argued that because of illegal actions by the EU (in principle, 
irrespective whether these were in breach of its international obligations or not), it suffered trade 
damage. The source of its claim is not WTO law, but EU actions. The legal point here is that using the 
WTO law as benchmark for testing the legality of EU actions is completely dissociated from direct 
effect. In fact the Court seems to conflate two distinct questions, namely: 
                                                     
11
 DSU stands for Dispute Settlement Understanding, the WTO Agreement regulating dispute settlement. 
12
 We say ‘could’, because it could also be the case that the two parties agree on the list of suspension of concessions as 
presented by the injured party. In this case, there is no need to have recourse to arbitration under Art. 22. DSU). 
13
 Both times involving payment by the US: once in a dispute on cotton with Brazil and once in a dispute on copyright with 
the EU. The latter is analysed in Grossman and Mavroidis (2003). We return to these instances below.  
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(a)  is the WTO law, as interpreted by WTO courts, a legal benchmark to evaluate the consistency of 
EU actions/omissions with its international obligations? 
(b)  who can invoke WTO law, as interpreted by WTO courts, before the ECJ?  
The Court has on a number of occasions dealt with this question In ‘Racke’ (C-162/96), the Court 
entertained the complaint by an individual against an EU regulation that had suspended the 
concessions granted under an international trade agreement to Yugoslavia. Racke, the individual, was 
arguing that the EU action was tantamount to a violation of the basic legal maxim pacta sunt 
servanda. In §51 of its judgment the Court held: 
In those circumstances, an individual relying in legal proceedings on rights which he derives 
directly from an agreement with a non-member country may not be denied the possibility of 
challenging the validity of a regulation which, by suspending the trade concessions granted by that 
agreement, prevents him from relying on it, and of invoking, in order to challenge the validity of 
the suspending regulation, obligations deriving from rules of customary international law which 
govern the termination and suspension of treaty relations.  
Years later, the same court, in C-366/10, was entertaining a claim by private operators (aviation 
companies) to the effect that the extension of the EU emissions trading scheme (limiting pollution by 
airplanes) to foreign carriers was not consistent with the EU obligations under customary international 
law. In §110 it held: 
However, since a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of 
precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited 
to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the European Union 
made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those principles (see, to 
this effect, Racke, paragraph 52). 
In none of these cases did the international law invoked by the complainants confer rights to 
individuals, and yet the Court did not reject the claims submitted arguing absence of direct effect. 
What is then so special about WTO law? In fact, we think that Fedon was an opportunity for the Court 
to draw an analogy with the Kraaijeveld-jurisprudence
14
 of the ECJ, where the Court moved away 
from direct effect-type of considerations to evaluate the legality of Dutch law. Fedon could have been 
the Kraaijeveld-equivalent for using international law to evaluate the legality of EU law. The ECJ 
failed to do that. This attitude however, can only incite similar reactions by others and ultimately may 
have detrimental impacts on international cooperation.  
To avoid any misunderstandings, we are not advocating direct effect of WTO law here.
15
 We are 
simply advocating that the WTO should be recognized as the benchmark to discuss the legality of EU 
actions. It is after all the EU that insisted on Art. 23.2 DSU which confers exclusive jurisdiction to 
WTO courts to interpret the covered agreements.
16
 Now, a few years later, it is the same EU that 
denies the WTO courts’ authority to do so. It seems that EU courts have adopted an attitude identical 
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 Prechal (2002) at pp. 17 ff. There is extensive case law where the Court dissociated the question of direct effect from that 
of consistency of EU law with public international law. Somehow, WTO-related case law is the one area where this is not 
the case. 
15
 A society has to weigh how it treats the right to property against its own incentives to comply with international 
obligations it has freely incurred. The whole idea of direct effect (i.e., that a private party can invoke before a court a 
provision of the EU treaty) underlying the landmark 1962 Van Gend en Loos decision was to ensure that private parties 
also derive rights from the EU construct and that this does not remain an isolated institution/document tucked away from 
reality. Direct effect should lead to more challenges, more testing of EU law by widening the basis of those who can 
invoke it (private parties as well, and not just states as was the case before Van Gend en Loos). Now the Court has turned 
this on its head: private parties cannot invoke it, while States cannot invoke WTO law.  
16
 Stewart (1999) contains all proposals submitted during the negotiations of the Uruguay round concerning Art. 23.2 DSU 
which reflects the obligation to submit disputes regarding the operation of the various WTO Agreements exclusively to 
the procedures established under the DSU. 
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to that of US courts. In Corus Staal BV and Corus Steel USA Inc. v. the Department of Commerce, 
[395 F. 3
rd
 1334 (Fed. Cir 2005)], the CAFC (Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), effectively 
held that the ‘Charming Betsy’ doctrine [Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US (2 Cranch) 
64, 118 (1804)], according to which courts should interpret US law whenever possible in a manner 
consistent with international obligations, does not apply to WTO dispute settlement decisions which 
are not binding on the US. The implication is that reciprocity considerations seem to matter a lot.  
No one is denying that private interests could be hurt as a result of pursuit of trade policies that are 
deemed to be in the general interest. Trade liberalization is, in general, welfare enhancing but this does 
not mean that there are no losers in national markets. Levy and Srinivasan (1996) show why it can 
make good sense to assign the responsibility to decide on questions such as the one at issue here 
(whether to comply) to the central government. Assigning the responsibility to a government 
guarantees that the society as a whole will profit from opening up the market (assuming the 
government acts to increase social welfare, a strong assumption, alas, on this occasion at least). It is up 
to the government then to decide whether to compensate losers. The questions for EU should be: is the 
exercise of our trade policy in the general interest? And if yes, what should the EU be doing to 
compensate those who end up losing in the name of general interest?  
In the present case, the response to the first question by most economists (and consumers) is likely 
to be a resounding ‘no’. Of greater significance is the second question: whether to compensate. The 
answer of the Court (and other European institutions) is ‘no’ again. In our view, refusing to 
compensate those who through their own industry are able to penetrate foreign markets and are 
subsequently excluded for no fault of their own is not satisfactory. It is this dimension of the case at 
hand that provides a rationale for compensation. We are not making a general argument that all losers 
from EU trade policy should have a legitimate claim for compensation. This would not only be 
unworkable but inappropriate as well. Trade policy in any democratic polity is made through a process 
in which competing and conflicting interests lobby for the policies that are most advantageous to them. 
The outcome of this policy-formation process is endogenous but presumably reflects a “political 
economy equilibrium” that is deemed to be what “society wants”. In this process there will be winners 
and losers but the losers will have had a shot at influencing the outcome. This outcome includes the 
various commitments that the EU negotiates in the WTO. The situation in the case at hand is very 
different: the outcome that reflects the political economy equilibrium is altered as a result of an action 
by a trading partner to defend its negotiated WTO rights that responds to an EU decision not to abide 
by its commitments.  
3. Bite the Bullet, Fedon (so says your Court) 
By keeping the WTO illegality in place the EU is essentially engaging in a redistributive policy: the 
bananas-importers (those selling ACP bananas) were not exposed to a greater level of international 
competition as they would have been if the WTO ruling was implemented, and thus benefited from 
higher profits. Fedon and other EU firms hit by the US-countermeasures saw the return on the 
successful investments they made in penetrating the US market greatly reduced: they must bite the 
bullet. 
The Court is there to test the legality of the actions of the agents of the European peoples, the EU 
institutions. The Court has established through its case law an elaborate system to test the legality of 
the activity of these institutions. Illegality can occur because either domestic or international law is 
breached. The EU has signed an agreement whereby it has accepted that WTO adjudicating bodies 
have a monopoly in determining the legality of actions by all trading partners (Art. 23.2 DSU). This is 
a contractual promise made by the EU to the rest of the world. Now that the WTO adjudicating bodies 
have made such a determination, the ECJ turns around and says that a wrong in the eyes of the WTO 
is not a wrong in the eyes of the EU institutions, because the EU action (or rather non-action) is in the 
general interest. 
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4. Another City, Another Court: Fedon in Strasbourg? 
Arguably, Fedon could have also litigated before the ECHR. To this effect, the lawyers of Fedon 
would have to persuade the Court that their case comes under its competence (according to protocols 1 
and 2, the Court is competent to adjudicate disputes regarding interventions to private property). Had 
it submitted a similar complaint, one can only speculate as to the eventual outcome. There are several 
legal as well as policy factors that cast doubt to the feasibility of similar action. 
First, Fedon would have to act against an EU institution before a court lying outside the EU 
institutional architecture and for this reason alone, it might think twice before doing so: it is one thing 
to clean dirty laundry in the house (Luxembourg), and quite different to do so abroad. But assuming 
any such diffidence had been overcome, Fedon would have to face a series of legal impediments that it 
would probably find it hard to overcome: 
First, there is the issue of causality: unless Fedon could show a causal link, in the legal sense of the 
term, between the EU decision to not comply with its obligations under the WTO and the damage 
inflicted to it, then its claim would not have succeeded in Strasbourg either. Now the response to this 
question is far from obvious: logically, there is rational connection between the two, in the sense that 
had the EU complied with its obligations then no damage could have ever resulted for Fedon. Rational 
connection is a looser test than causality though. The Court could, for example, have taken the view 
that between the EU decision to not comply and the damage suffered by Fedon the causal ‘chain’ is 
interrupted since the discretion of the US government enters the picture. In other words, since the US 
could have chosen a different target, the damage suffered by Fedon is not the direct result of the EU 
decision to not comply, but of the exercise of discretion by the US government.  
But even if the Strasbourg Court takes the view that a causal link is established in the present case, 
then the EU could always respond that its actions were dictated by the pursuance of the general EU 
interest and that they were proportional to the objective pursued. It would take a very courageous 
Court indeed to second-guess the EU in this respect, and we have no tangible reason to invest in this 
perspective. For this reason we believe that a similar claim in Strasbourg would not end up the way 
Fedon would have wished to. 
Fedon could also face arguments regarding, for example, exhaustion of local remedies: Fedon had 
not argued interventions to its private property before EU courts, and the doctrine of exhaustion of 
local remedies espoused by the ECHR could present yet another obstacle for the lawyers of Fedon.  
Finally, under its ‘Bosphorus’ case law (2005), the ECHR has accepted the principle of equivalent 
protection between the EU and the ECHR-legal order. In this vein, the Court in Strasbourg might find 
it hard to decide against the level of protection afforded to Fedon by the Luxembourg court, even 
though the principle mentioned here simply creates a rebuttable and not an irrebutable presumption. 
Under the circumstances one can only conclude that a challenge before the ECHR was unlikely to 
succeed.
17
 
5. A Way Out of the Current Mess 
In effect, what we have in the case at hand is an example of a ‘regulatory taking’. Fedon is not able to 
contest it because the action is deemed to be in the interest of the EU as a whole, but clearly it has 
suffered a loss as a direct result of the EU decision not to comply with the WTO ruling. The fact that 
the US imposes the harm is irrelevant, except insofar as the motivation underlying the 
countermeasures is to induce the EU to comply. The US action is costly, both to itself (US consumers 
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 This conclusion nevertheless, should be taken with a pinch of salt. We can only state in definitive manner in presence of 
case law to this effect. There is none. As a result, it is probably recommendable (assuming manageable opportunity cost) 
to pursue a similar avenue in the future, the low likelihood of succeeding notwithstanding. 
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of the imported products pay higher prices and/or are induced to switch to less desirable varieties) and 
to the affected EU producers, their workers and their communities. Indeed, the costs of retaliation may 
be increased by the fact that the US uses a so-called carousel approach—it changes the list of products 
to retaliate on periodically, in the process creating uncertainty regarding the conditions of market 
access that will prevail for a larger set of EU exporters than those subject to retaliation at any given 
point in time.
18
  
Action by the EU to compensate Fedon (and by implication, all the other EU firms hit by the US 
retaliation) would alter the incidence of the costs of countermeasures. Instead of telling some firms to 
bite the bullet and ‘take one for the team’ it would appear much more logical – given the presumption 
that the EU decision is in the general interest – that the cost of the retaliation be spread across the EU 
population. Offering financial compensation for trade losses incurred by the targeted EU firms would 
achieve this, as the compensation would have to be paid for. If it comes from general taxpayer-funded 
sources the costs of the EU policy would be spread widely, as is appropriate given that the general 
interest is served by the EU’s trade policy. This could also improve allocative efficiency and reduce 
the real resource costs associated with carousel retaliation—while firms would still be hit by higher 
tariffs if they are targeted, they can decide to pass on the compensation to their importers to allow 
them to offset the effect of the tariff. 
A legal issue which might arise were such a solution to be adopted is that the EU could be accused 
before the WTO of subsidizing its domestic producers. Recall that by virtue of Arts. 1 and 2 of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), a scheme is considered to be a 
subsidy if a financial contribution confers a benefit to specific recipients. Two types of instruments 
(export subsidies and local content incentives) are illegal under the WTO; all other instruments that 
qualify as subsidies can be counteracted: a WTO Member can either impose countervailing duties 
(CVDs) against exports of companies that have benefitted from subsidies, or can challenge their 
consistency before the WTO and request that they be adjusted (or even, withdrawn). The question that 
arises here is whether the EU risks being accused for subsidization in case it compensates innocent 
bystanders like Fedon who have been hurt by WTO legal countermeasures.
19
 
The first criterion, namely, financial contribution, is of course satisfied in our scheme.
20
 There is 
doubt however that a benefit is conferred: were a Panel to take the view that a narrow set of facts is 
properly before it, that is, the provision of a financial contribution to operators, then undoubtedly the 
second criterion is met as well. However, if a Panel were to take the view that it has the mandate to 
inquire into the rationale for procuring a benefit, then the opposite should be true since, at the end of 
the day, economic operators will not be receiving anything beyond what they would have received 
from the market (assuming the compensation is limited to lost trade). Unfortunately there is no case 
law suggesting that an inquiry into the rationale for subsidization is appropriate when deciding 
whether a benefit has been conferred. Indeed, this was the reason for including Art. 8 in the SCM 
Agreement, a provision that exonerated from liability three forms of subsidies aiming at providing 
(more or less) public goods. Art. 8 SCM lapsed in 2000, however, and to date no WTO Panel has ever 
pronounced on similar grounds: a benefit has been bestowed, according to standard case law, if an 
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 The incentive effects of pursuing carousel retaliation are ambiguous. A greater number of EU firms will need to factor in 
the probability of being hit – which can be expected to increase the number of firms and industries that will push for the 
EU to bring its trade policy into compliance with its WTO obligations – but carousel retaliation also reduces the cost of 
retaliation for EU firms that are hit as this will at least be time bound. Whatever the net impact on compliance incentives 
and total welfare cost of retaliation/noncompliance, how retaliation is put into effect has no implications for the argument 
for compensation.  
19
 We should note at the outset that if the response is affirmative then the US in our example would have even more of an 
incentive to choose those targets that will make more noise through their lobbying efforts in Brussels, since the only way 
to make them stop making noise would be for the EU to comply with its obligations.  
20
 This is not compensation in the sense of Art. 22 DSU since the beneficiary is not a third state but EU economic operators. 
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individual receives from the government what he/she could not receive from the market with no 
additional inquiry into the rationale for subsidization full stop. 
We are thus left with the last element: specificity. Case law
21
 has consistently held that both de jure 
(e.g. by statutory language the list of beneficiaries is limited to a few operators) and de facto (e.g. in 
the absence of similar statutory language, the measure operates so as to limit the list of beneficiaries to 
a few operators) schemes are covered, Adopting a law that would provide for compensation of 
innocent bystanders would fall, if at all, under the latter category. But then it would be impossible to 
demonstrate that the EU would know ex ante the identity of the firms that eventually would be 
compensates (subsidized). There is an analogy to free (but non-compulsory) education: a state 
provides it without knowing who will make use of it, let alone intending for specific beneficiaries. The 
identity of beneficiaries will depend on the action not of the subsidizer but of a third entity, in our 
example, the US. For these reasons, we believe that the better arguments lie with the view that similar 
schemes should not be considered specific. 
An even better solution to the problem of addressing the specific costs to targeted firms from 
noncompliance by the EU is one where EU exporters are not retaliated against in the first place. Firms 
would then not confront the costs associated with reallocating output etc. Economists and lawyers 
have long advocated greater use of direct compensation of the negatively affected trading partner in 
cases like the one at hand.
22
 The EU could have simply transferred the value of the lost trade volume 
as determined by the WTO arbitrators to the US, i.e., some US$200 million a year.  
As noted above, there is precedent for financial compensation to be used in instances where a WTO 
Member is not in a position to comply with a WTO ruling. In US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, a 
dispute brought by the EU in which the WTO ruled against the US, the US was not able to revise its 
legislation within the reasonable period of time established by the WTO. Arbitration determined that 
the loss incurred by the EU as a result of the illegal US action amounted to €1,219,900 per year. As 
part of the Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, signed into law on 16 April 2003, the US 
Congress approved a $3.3 million appropriation – to cover three years of payments – which was 
subsequently paid to the European Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers, at the request of 
the European Commission.
23
 There is no legal or technical impediment to the European Commission 
undertaking a similar initiative in the case at hand.  
A solution along these lines was also adopted in US-Upland Cotton. In this case, Brazil won its 
claim that the US government had been subsidizing the production of upland cotton, and the two 
governments concluded a ‘Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the 
WTO’. According to the agreed framework, the US government agreed to transfer funds to an entity 
designated by Brazil. The Brazilian government would in turn use this money for technical assistance 
and capacity building activities such as promotion of use of cotton, natural resources management and 
conservation, application of post-harvest technology etc.
24
 All such activities of course, could be 
characterized as subsidies, but no one mounted a challenge against Brazil for disbursing funds in this 
way.  
In these two examples, the legal question remains the same: are we in presence of a subsidy? The 
difference between these two instances where compensation was paid and the solution we advocate to 
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 For an overview of the case law in this respect, see Rubini (2009); see also Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters (2008).  
22
 See for example, Hudec (2002) and Bronckers and van den Broek (2005). Limão and Saggi (2008) show that a system of 
monetary fines that is supported by the threat of tariff retaliation is more efficient than one based on retaliation alone. 
23
 The funds were used for combating piracy on the Internet and supporting actions to strengthen copyright enforcement in 
Europe and the United States—see Hoekman and Kostecki (2009). The details of the arbitration award are discussed in 
Grossman and Mavroidis (2003). 
24
 WTO Doc. WT/DS267/45 of August 31, 2010. See also US Department of State, International Agreements Other Than 
Treaties Transmitted in Accordance with the Provisions of 1 USC 112b as Amended. 
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the innocent bystander problem from a pure legal perspective is that it could be the US that might be 
accused of subsidization. This is not compelling. While it is probably too early to speak of 
acquiescence, one case of compensation is an accident, but two cases start taking us down the 
continuum towards the direction of ‘practice’. It seems that WTO Members are willing to accept that 
payments of this sort should not enter the framework of the SCM Agreement, either because they do 
not consider them to confer a benefit or because they fail the specificity-requirement. 
While a shift towards the use of financial compensation would help solve one problem it may give 
rise to another. From a systemic, WTO compliance-perspective, such a move could reduce compliance 
incentives, as the individual (per EU household) cost of compensating the affected European firms 
will be (very) small—just a few Euros a year. At the same time, the evidence suggests that while firms 
like Fedon incur high costs and as a result have big incentives to lobby for policy reform (and to 
litigate), it is not very effective in inducing compliance. The illegal Banana policy lasted for many 
years. Complaints by negatively affected firms such as Fedon do not appear to have played any role in 
the eventual reform of EU policy.  
There is a broader point here. At present, retaliation by one WTO Member randomly (at least from 
the perspective of the targeted firms) imposes excess costs on the affected exporters in the WTO 
member maintaining illegal policies. But the same would happen if the latter was to renegotiate the 
terms of the WTO contract with the former. Thus, if the EU were to take the position that it is not in its 
interest to comply with a WTO ruling it can offer the US other trade concessions. This would give rise 
to the same sort of effects as selective US retaliation: some industries and firms would be negatively 
affected on a rather arbitrary basis and therefore result in "inequitable" outcomes. This suggests there 
is a case for a general rule to be proposed: either offer financial compensation during the period in 
which there is no compliance with a WTO ruling or compensate all the exporters targeted by 
retaliation, in both instances shifting the cost to taxpayers. This leaves it to the US to continue to make 
the case in the WTO for compliance. If it becomes clear that there is not going to be compliance, the 
EU has the choice of either continuing to pay compensation indefinitely or to engage in renegotiations 
with the US. The latter is the primary mechanism foreseen in the GATT/WTO to address matters of 
this type and there is a long history of successful renegotiation of tariff commitments. We would argue 
that such renegotiations should be pursued in a way that affects all import-competing industries in EU 
proportionately so as to maintain the initial structure of relative protection, as that presumably 
reflected the political economy equilibrium that prevailed at the time the EU engaged in the original 
exchange of market access concessions with the US (and other WTO members if this exchange took 
place in a multilateral round of trade negotiations).
25
  
An implication of our suggestion is that policy is moved towards improving economic welfare by 
lowering trade barriers. This is also a key dimension of the approach proposed by Lawrence (2003), 
who calls on WTO members when negotiating market access liberalization to identify ex ante which 
tariffs/sectors would be targeted for additional liberalization in cases such as the one discussed in this 
paper. In practice governments have not shown any interest in pursuing that idea, but the ex post 
approach sketched out above would be a feasible path to move from retaliation and the associated 
welfare costs towards a system where the remedy involves trade liberalization. Moving towards 
greater neutrality in the incidence of the adjustment costs associated with noncompliance/renegotiation 
would both safeguard the implicit property rights of EU firms and do more to protect the general 
interest – if defined as the overall economic welfare of the European Union.  
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 In practice a uniform tariff reduction strategy is unlikely to be feasible because there is another party at the table with 
export interests in specific industries. Thus, reductions may need to be limited to a subset of sectors. But the principle of 
‘spreading the pain’ as equitably as possible across EU industries should continue to apply.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
The ECJ, in its Fedon judgment, confused two issues: the issue of relevance of WTO law (as 
benchmark to evaluate the consistency of EU actions with the international obligations assumed by the 
EU by virtue of its adherence to the WTO), and the issue of locus standi, e.g. who can legitimately 
claim a breach of WTO obligations by the EU before the Luxembourg courts. In doing that, it 
condoned a practice of re-distribution of wealth across segments of the EU society in the name of the 
‘general’ EU interest. This is wrong. While we believe that there is no place for direct effect of WTO 
law in the EU legal order, we have argued why the EU should compensate losers like Fedon who play 
the game by the rules. Taking one for the team is commendable when it is the team, and not another 
individual player that profits. We have pointed to avenues that the EU institutions could explore in 
order to avoid repetition of the unfortunate Fedon-experience in the future. 
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